Izvestiya of Saratov University.

Philosophy. Psychology. Pedagogy

ISSN 1819-7671 (Print)
ISSN 2542-1948 (Online)


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Somova O. A. The soul as the substance of a personality: Phenomenological pro et contra. Izvestiya of Saratov University. Philosophy. Psychology. Pedagogy, 2024, vol. 24, iss. 1, pp. 51-55. DOI: 10.18500/1819-7671-2024-24-1-51-55, EDN: MSGPVF

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MSGPVF

The soul as the substance of a personality: Phenomenological pro et contra

Autors: 
Somova Oksana Andreevna, Saratov State University
Abstract: 

Introduction. The article reveals some methodological aspects of the phenomenological discussion of the personal subject. The dispute is caused by realistic tendencies in phenomenology, according to which the totality of properties of a thing allows us to assert the existence of their ontological basis, which is contained in the essence of the thing. In the case of a human being, such ontological foundation is the soul, which determines the basic characteristics of the personality that exist prior to any constitution. Theoretical analysis. The article argues for the contradictory nature of such concepts by appealing to M. Heidegger’s method of work. Firstly, justification is associated with the absence of obvious givenness of any essence within immanent perception, secondly, ontological categories of the structure of the personal subject are a tribute to the previous philosophical tradition, not its criticism, and thirdly, postulation of the ontological basis of properties continue the naturalistic explanation of natural sciences. Conclusion. A conclusion is made about the closeness of Heidegger’s method of philosophising to the original beginnings of phenomenology, as well as to the requirements of the phenomenology of the spiritual world set out in the second volume of Husserl’s "Ideas". The hypothesis is put forward according to which further study of the personal subject can be continued beyond the framework of substantialist concepts.

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Received: 
10.12.2023
Accepted: 
12.01.2024
Published: 
29.03.2024