Introduction. The article is devoted to consideration of the state of modern ontological thought. It is no coincidence that after Heidegger there is virtually no systematic consideration of the concept of being in philosophy. Does this mean that the problem of being has lost its relevance? Or does this indicate that the concept of being continues (albeit in a negative way) to determine the face of modern philosophy? The author proposes to consider the history of ontology through the sequential passage of three stages: ”ontology of being” – ”ontology of the due” – ”ontology of declaration”. Theoretical analysis. At the first stage, the example of the four limitations of being according to Heidegger's point of view is considered: ”becoming”, ”appearance”, ”thinking” and ”due”. At the same time, the fundamental difference between what should be and the other three restrictions is pointed out. The origin of the ”due” from the normative-legal mindset is analyzed. Then a brief description of the fundamental differences of the “ontology of declaration” versus the “ontology of being” and the “ontology of the due” is given. It is indicated that the source of the emergence of the “ontology of declaration” should be seen in the works of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and its consistent development in the projects of object-oriented ontology. Conclusion. As a result, it is pointed out that a “declaration ontology” is not a “declaration of an ontology”. A preliminary forecast for the further development of the “ontology of declaration” is given.