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Koda N. V. The question of normativity in the concept of truth as unconcealedness by M. Heidegger. Izvestiya of Saratov University. Philosophy. Psychology. Pedagogy, 2021, vol. 21, iss. 2, pp. 139-142. DOI:

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The question of normativity in the concept of truth as unconcealedness by M. Heidegger

 The article is devoted to the consideration of the issue of normativity in the concept of truth as unconcealedness (ἀλήθεια) by M. Heidegger. The question of the normativity of truth as unconcealedness (ἀλήθεια) greatly worried Heidegger's critics even during the philosopher's life. The article reveals the perspective of this criticism in the context of the “argument of law” and understanding the boundaries of conceptual normativity regarding truth. The analysis of unconcealedness (ἀλήθεια) in Martin Heidegger's philosophy in the view of the question of normativity is carried out through consideration of the following aspects: whether the truth should be a normative concept, what "right" unconcealedness has to "name" the truth, why unconcealedness (ἀλήθεια) was never a concept in a strict sense of the word in the thinker's work. The analysis leads to the conclusion that truth as unconcealedness (ἀλήθεια) is deliberately extracted by Heidegger from conceptual boundaries, being a part of a plan to overcome metaphysical thinking. Heidegger's terms cannot be understood in the usual system of categories, because the philosopher sought to overcome the normative framework of the concept. The conclusion is formulated according to which the absence of normative conceptual boundaries does not deprive the unconcealedness of the “right” to be called truth, since truth can have, in addition to conceptual, other dimensions.

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