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Pimanov A. S. Determinism and the problem of actual future. Izvestiya of Saratov University. Philosophy. Psychology. Pedagogy, 2022, vol. 22, iss. 3, pp. 267-271. DOI:

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Determinism and the problem of actual future

Introduction. This article raises the question of the role of determinism in the formation of the Thin Red Line hypothesis. This hypothesis is one of the few branches of logic which address the problems of determinism and actual future. The author considers how certain logical and philosophical preconditions led to the formation of the Thin Red Line hypothesis as a compatibilist view, according to which in the presence of an open branched future that provides indeterminism, one can argue that the future is in some way directed toward actual history. Theoretical analysis. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of deterministic arguments in the works by Arthur Prior and Peter Ohrstrom. The author considers the idea that the initial effort to overcome theological determinism through Thin Red Line hypothesis within a temporal logic encountered a number of other deterministic problems that undermine the foundation of Thin Red Line hypothesis. In particular, emphasis is placed on the fact that the Thin Red Line hypothesis has certain problems with expressing the relevance of the future. The arguments against Thin Red Line hypothesis by Belnap and Green are described in detail. Conclusion. An assessment of the current state of Thin Red Line hypothesis and possible directions for further research on this topic are explored.

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